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In preparation for checking key presence and downloading needed keys
before conflict checking.
Signed-off-by: Allan McRae <allan@archlinux.org>
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Signed-off-by: Gerardo Exequiel Pozzi <vmlinuz386@yahoo.com.ar>
Signed-off-by: Allan McRae <allan@archlinux.org>
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Signed-off-by: Gerardo Exequiel Pozzi <vmlinuz386@yahoo.com.ar>
Signed-off-by: Allan McRae <allan@archlinux.org>
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Signed-off-by: Allan McRae <allan@archlinux.org>
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The warning given for a signature timstamp being in the future compared
to the system time stated the opposite.
Also, move this warning to debug output. It is useless in its current
form as the package or database that is giving the error is not
mentioned and so other debug output is needed to find the offending
signature.
Signed-off-by: Allan McRae <allan@archlinux.org>
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GPG signatures have a timestamp which is checked and if it's in the
future, verification will fail.
Dan: slight wording change.
Signed-off-by: Florian Pritz <bluewind@xinu.at>
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Detected by clang scan-build static code analyzer.
* Don't attempt to free an uninitialized gpgme key variable
* Initialize answer variable before asking frontend a question
* Pass by reference instead of value if uninitialized fields are
possible in download signal handler code
* Ensure we never call strlen() on NULL payload->remote_name value
Signed-off-by: Dan McGee <dan@archlinux.org>
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Conflicts:
lib/libalpm/signing.c
lib/libalpm/sync.c
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For key searches only, gpg2 will fail to lookup any and all keys that
are not prefixed with 0x.
Signed-off-by: Dave Reisner <dreisner@archlinux.org>
Signed-off-by: Dan McGee <dan@archlinux.org>
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Conflicts:
lib/libalpm/diskspace.c
src/pacman/util.h
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Signed-off-by: Dan McGee <dan@archlinux.org>
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We don't need to open the data to be checked if we don't have a
signature to check against, so postpone that open until we know we have
either the base64_data or a valid signature file.
Signed-off-by: Dan McGee <dan@archlinux.org>
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Conflicts:
lib/libalpm/signing.c
Signed-off-by: Dan McGee <dan@archlinux.org>
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PGP keyservers are pieces of sh** when it comes to searching for
subkeys, and only allow it if you submit an 8-character fingerprint
rather than the recommended and less chance of collision 16-character
fingerprint.
Add a second remote lookup for the 8-character version of a key ID if we
don't find anything the first time we look up the key. This fixes
FS#27612 and the deficiency has been sent upstream to the GnuPG users
mailing list as well.
Signed-off-by: Dan McGee <dan@archlinux.org>
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Ensures that config.h is always ordered correctly (first) in the
includes. Also means that new source files get this for free without
having to remember to add it.
We opt for -imacros over -include as its more portable, and the
added constraint by -imacros doesn't bother us for config.h.
This also touches the HACKING file to remove the explicit mention of
config.h as part of the includes.
Signed-off-by: Dave Reisner <dreisner@archlinux.org>
Signed-off-by: Dan McGee <dan@archlinux.org>
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Signed-off-by: Florian Pritz <bluewind@xinu.at>
Signed-off-by: Dan McGee <dan@archlinux.org>
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Dan: const pointers, don't worry about bitfields.
Signed-off-by: Florian Pritz <bluewind@xinu.at>
Signed-off-by: Dan McGee <dan@archlinux.org>
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The absolutely terrible part about this is the failure on GPGME's part
to distinguish between "key not found" and "keyserver timeout". Instead,
it returns the same silly GPG_ERR_EOF in both cases (why isn't
GPG_ERR_TIMEOUT being used?), leaving us helpless to tell them apart.
Spit out a generic enough error message that covers both cases;
unfortunately we can't provide much guidance to the user because we
aren't sure what actually happened.
Signed-off-by: Dan McGee <dan@archlinux.org>
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This should help point users in the right direction if they have not
initialized via pacman-key just yet.
Signed-off-by: Dan McGee <dan@archlinux.org>
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In the default configuration, we can enter the signing code but still
have nothing to do with GPGME- for example, if database signatures are
optional but none are present. Delay initialization of GPGME until we
know there is a signature file present or we were passed base64-encoded
data.
This also makes debugging with valgrind a lot easier as you don't have
to deal with all the GPGME error noise because their code leaks like a
sieve.
Signed-off-by: Dan McGee <dan@archlinux.org>
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I'm really good at breaking this on a regular basis. If only we had some
sort of automated testing for this...
Signed-off-by: Dan McGee <dan@archlinux.org>
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This is just a wrapper function; the real function we call logs an
almost identical line.
Signed-off-by: Dan McGee <dan@archlinux.org>
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A few parameters were outdated or wrongly named, and a few things were
explicitly linked that Doxygen wasn't able to resolve.
Signed-off-by: Dan McGee <dan@archlinux.org>
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This adds calls to gpgme_op_import_result() which we were not looking at
before to ensure the key was actually imported. Additionally, we do some
preemptive checks to ensure the keyring is even writable if we are going
to prompt the user to add things to it.
Signed-off-by: Dan McGee <dan@archlinux.org>
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This also fixes a segfault found by dave when key_search is
unsuccessful; the key_search return code documentation has also been
updated to reflect reality.
Signed-off-by: Dan McGee <dan@archlinux.org>
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Because we aren't using gpgv and a dedicated keyring that is known to be
all safe, we should honor this flag being set on a given key in the
keyring to know to not honor it. This prevents a key from being
reimported that a user does not want to be used- instead of deleting,
one should mark it as disabled.
Signed-off-by: Dan McGee <dan@archlinux.org>
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Add two new static methods, key_search() and key_import(), to our
growing list of signing code.
If we come across a key we do not have, attempt to look it up remotely
and ask the user if they wish to import said key. If they do, flag the
validation process as a potential 'retry', meaning it might succeed the
next time it is ran.
These depend on you having a 'keyserver hkp://foo.example.com' line in
your gpg.conf file in your gnupg home directory to function.
Signed-off-by: Dan McGee <dan@archlinux.org>
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Signed-off-by: Dan McGee <dan@archlinux.org>
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If siglist->results wasn't a NULL pointer, we would try to free it
anyway, even if siglist->count was zero. Only attempt to free this
pointer if we had results and the pointer is valid.
Signed-off-by: Dan McGee <dan@archlinux.org>
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In reality, there is no retrying that happens as of now because we don't
have any import or changing of the keyring going on, but the code is set
up so we can drop this in our new _alpm_process_siglist() function. Wire
up the basics to the sync database validation code, so we see something
like the following:
$ pacman -Ss unknowntrust
error: core: signature from "Dan McGee <dpmcgee@gmail.com>" is unknown trust
error: core: signature from "Dan McGee <dpmcgee@gmail.com>" is unknown trust
error: database 'core' is not valid (invalid or corrupted database (PGP signature))
$ pacman -Ss missingsig
error: core: missing required signature
error: core: missing required signature
error: database 'core' is not valid (invalid or corrupted database (PGP signature))
Yes, there is some double output, but this should be fixable in the
future.
Signed-off-by: Dan McGee <dan@archlinux.org>
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This will make its way up the call chain eventually to allow trusting
and importing of keys as necessary.
Signed-off-by: Dan McGee <dan@archlinux.org>
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Signed-off-by: Dan McGee <dan@archlinux.org>
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Neither deltas nor filename attributes are ever present in the local
database, so we can remove all of the indirection for accessing these
attributes.
Signed-off-by: Dan McGee <dan@archlinux.org>
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Signed-off-by: Dan McGee <dan@archlinux.org>
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I was trying to take a shortcut and not introduce a wrapper struct for
the signature results, so packed it all into alpm_sigresult_t in the
first iteration. However, this is painful when one wants to add new
fields or only return information regarding a single signature.
Refactor the type into a few components which are exposed to the end
user, and will allow a lot more future flexibility. This also exposes
more information regarding the key to the frontend than was previously
available.
The "private" void *data pointer is used by the library to store the
actual key object returned by gpgme; it is typed this way so the
frontend has no expectations of what is there, and so we don't have any
hard gpgme requirement in our public API.
Signed-off-by: Dan McGee <dan@archlinux.org>
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Signed-off-by: Diogo Sousa <diogogsousa@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan McGee <dan@archlinux.org>
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Don't force 'never'; you should be checking both the status and validity
anyway.
Signed-off-by: Dan McGee <dan@archlinux.org>
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Signed-off-by: Dan McGee <dan@archlinux.org>
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This one wasn't all that necessary as we only used it in one place in
the function, which can be checked easily enough at the call site.
Signed-off-by: Dan McGee <dan@archlinux.org>
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These are all available directly on the handle without indirection.
Signed-off-by: Dan McGee <dan@archlinux.org>
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This function is used regardless of whether gpgme support is enabled, so
make sure it is always accessible.
Signed-off-by: Dan McGee <dan@archlinux.org>
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The precedence goes as follows: signature > sha256sum > md5sum
Add some logic and helper methods to check what we have available when
loading a package, and then only check what is necessary to verify the
package. This should speed up sync database verifies as we no longer
will be doing both a checksum and a signature validation.
Signed-off-by: Dan McGee <dan@archlinux.org>
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We may end up allocating 1 or 2 extra bytes this way, but it is worth it
to simplify the method and not have to call base64_decode() a second
time. Use the hueristic that base64 encoding produces 3 bytes of decoded
data for every 4 bytes of encoded data.
Signed-off-by: Dan McGee <dan@archlinux.org>
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Also adjust our code using it for the size_t adjustments made by
upstream.
Signed-off-by: Dan McGee <dan@archlinux.org>
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This ensures we are actually making correct use of the information gpgme
is returning to us. Marginal being allowed was obvious before, but
Unknown should deal with trust level, and not the presence or lack
thereof of a public key to validate the signature with.
Return status and validity information in two separate values so check
methods and the frontend can use them independently. For now, we treat
expired keys as valid, while expired signatures are invalid.
Signed-off-by: Dan McGee <dan@archlinux.org>
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Signed-off-by: Florian Pritz <bluewind@xinu.at>
Signed-off-by: Dan McGee <dan@archlinux.org>
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If we can't read the keyring, gpgme will output confusing debug
information and fail to verify the signature, so we should log some
debug information.
Signed-off-by: Florian Pritz <bluewind@xinu.at>
Signed-off-by: Dan McGee <dan@archlinux.org>
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Signed-off-by: Allan McRae <allan@archlinux.org>
Signed-off-by: Dan McGee <dan@archlinux.org>
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